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Abstract
This paper studies the determinants of capital structure choice of Dutch
ﬁrms. Our main objective is to investigate whether and to what extent the
main capital structure theories can explain capital structure choice of Dutch
ﬁrms. A better understanding of the capital structure determinants in a rela-
tively small yet open industrialized economy is essential not only for enrich-
ing empirical studies in this ﬁeld, but also for the purpose of cross country
asset evaluation. By estimating a panel data model explaining both the ab-
solute level of leverage with respect to various factors and the year-to-year
changes in leverage with respect to the changes of various factors, we ﬁnd
evidence suggesting the relevance of the pecking order hypothesis in ex-
plaining the ﬁnancing choice of Dutch ﬁrms, which implies the importance
of asymmetric information models in explaining capital structure choice of
Dutch ﬁrms. We argue that factors based on agency costs and corporate con-
trol considerations are relatively unimportant for the Dutch case.
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11. Introduction
Forty years ago, Modigliani and Miller (1958) illustrated that if the ﬁnancial market
is perfect and if there are no taxes or transaction costs, a ﬁrm’s value depends solely
on the level and risk of its future cash ﬂows. In that case, ﬁrms will be indifferent
with regard to ﬁnancing investment with internal or different forms of external funds.
This implies that there does not exist an optimal capital structure because a ﬁrm’s
value cannot be affected by its choice of ﬁnancing.
Since the publication of the seminal article of Modigliani and Miller, a vast theo-
retical literature has emerged to identify the conditions under which the irrelevance
hypothesis does no longer hold. Harris and Raviv (1991) survey the theoretical liter-
ature that explains differences in observed capital structures in developed economies.
This theoretical literature has proven that the assumptions underlying the Modigliani
and Miller theory are, in general, not fulﬁlled.
However, empirical evidence on the determinants of ﬁrm’s capital structure is still
scarce. Among the most important empirical studies are Titman and Wessels (1988)
and Rajan and Zingales (1995). Titman and Wessels perform an empirical study on
the determinants of capital structure choice in the United States. Rajan and Zingales
(1995) attempt to give more empirical evidence on the determinants of capital struc-
ture by providing a detailed study on how institutional factors can explain differences
in ﬁrms’ capital structures in the largest industrial countries. For a relatively complete
survey of the empirical literature on capital structure until the beginning of the 1990s,
see Cools (1993).
This paper presents an empirical analysis of capital structure of Dutch ﬁrms. The
objective is to investigate whether and to what extent the main capital structure the-
ories can explain capital structure choice of Dutch ﬁrms. The Dutch case provides
additional insights, since the Netherlands is a small open economy with an over-
representation of large- scale internationally oriented ﬁrms. Moreover, Dutch cor-
porate governance is a mixture of Anglosaxon market- and German Bank-relation
models. The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, by providing information on
the capital structure choice of Dutch ﬁrms and on the Dutch corporate governance
system, the paper gives a descriptive analysis of the relevance of different capital
structure theories for the Netherlands. Second, the study further examines the rel-
evance of different capital structure theories by a panel data regression for listed
Dutch ﬁrms for the period 1984-1995. There are a few recent studies on Dutch cap-
ital structure available. Good examples are Scholtens (1997) and De Bondt (1998).
However, they refer to the macro level. In our opinion, a better understanding of the
determinants of capital structure of Dutch ﬁrms requires the usage of ﬁrm level mi-
2cro data. This will not only improve the understanding of the Dutch case, but it also
tests for the robustness of the evidence brought forward by studies on other coun-
tries. To the best of our knowledge, Cools (1993) is the only relatively recent study
on Dutch capital structure choice which bases the empirical analysis on a panel of
ﬁrm level data. In his study, ﬁrm level data for two periods (1977-1978 and 1987-
1988) is used. An important difference between our study and that of Cools (1993)
is that we use a longer observation period and more recent data. We think that this
may give a better understanding of capital structure choice of Dutch ﬁrms. The ﬁnal
contribution of our paper is that the panel regression of the model in ﬁrst differences
alleviates the problem of heteroscedasticity as well as auto- and cross-correlation of
the error terms, thus improves the robustness of the OLS estimation results. Most
capital structure studies, including the one by Cools 1, use a ﬁxed effects panel data
approach. Basically this comes down to a transformation of the original data set by
subtracting the means of individual ﬁrm observations from the original observations
and then applying the least-squares method to the transformed data. A drawback of
that approach is that it is not heteroscedastic consistent and assumes that disturbances
are not autocorrelated. Due to size differences of ﬁrms in the panel, the disturbance
terms probably will not have the same variance and hence heteroscedasticity may
be an important phenomenon in this kind of studies, even after scaling the data set.
Moreover, a random shock affecting one ﬁrm may also affect other ﬁrms because of
close ties between the ﬁrms. Hence, in panel data sets, especially when several years
are taken into account, it may well be the case that disturbances are correlated with
one another. As is well known, the violation of sperical disturbances (disturbances
have uniform variance and are not autocorrelated) may reduce the efﬁciency of the
estimates considerably.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some macroeconomic ﬁgures
concerning the ﬁnancing choice of Dutch ﬁrms. Section 3 gives a brief review of
capital structure theory and relates that to the situation in the Netherlands. It gives a
ﬁrstideaabout therelevance ofdifferent capital structure theories for theNetherlands.
Section 4 discusses the capital structure determinants and their proxy variables which
will be used in the panel data study. It also explains which proxies we use for capital
structure. Section 5 describes the data set we use in this analysis, and provides some
important summary statistics. In section 6, after presenting the results for the ﬁxed
effects least-squares regression of both the absolute level and the year-to-year change
models, we give a further interpretation of the empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
1 It should be noted that Cools, in line with Titman and Wessels (1988) also uses the LISREL
technique.
32. Macroeconomic facts for the Netherlands
This section provides some macroeconomic information on the ﬁnancing choice of
Dutch ﬁrms. It is a ﬁrst attempt to characterize the capital structure choice of the
Dutch corporate sector, as compared to some other industrialized countries. The anal-
ysis is summarized in Table 1, which gives aggregate ﬁgures for some industrial-
ized countries, including the Netherlands. All ﬁgures in the table are from De Bondt
(1998) .
The second and third column refer to the leverage ratio. Rajan and Zingales (1995)
present and critically discuss several measures of the leverage ratio. They also point
at accounting differences among countries, so that a comparison may need some
adjustments in the leverage ratio. However, since adjusted leverage ratios are not
yet available for the Netherlands, we restrict the analysis to the debt-equity ratio as
a proxy for leverage. By taking this caveat into account, the table shows that the
leverage ratio in all countries has declined during the 1980s. It also appears that the
aggregate leverage ratio in the Netherlands in 1992 is much smaller than that of Italy.
However, by and large, it is comparable to the leverage ratios of Germany, France,
the UK and Belgium.
The fourth column gives information on the relative importance of the public mar-
ket (stocks and bonds) vis-` a-vis the private market (ﬁnancial intermediaries, such as
banks). It appears that in none of the countries the public market is important as a
provider of credit to the private sector. In the Netherlands, the share of loans from
the private market is even 97%. However, it should be noted that these ﬁgures refer
to the entire private sector, so that for the corporate sector the picture may change
somewhat. Nevertheless, it indicates the importance of ﬁnancial intermediaries as
providers of credit.
A closer look at the indirect credit market makes clear that the banking sector is by
far the most important ﬁnancial intermediary in all selected countries (see column 5).
However, there is a clear difference between the Netherlands and the other countries.
In all countries, except for the Netherlands, the share of bank loans in total loans
to the private sector is above 85 %. The share is lower in the Netherlands, due to a
relatively important role for institutional investors.
Another important difference between the Netherlands and other industrialized coun-
tries concerns the concentration rate of commercial banks. In the Netherlands, the
banking system is extremely concentrated: the share of the three main banks (ABN-
AMRO, Rabobank and ING bank) in total bank assets is almost 85%. This is much
higher than in the other countries under consideration. In Germany the concentration
rate of the top three banks is even below 20%. Moreover, the last column in the Table
4shows that the share of long-term credit as a percentage of total credit to the corporate
sector is relatively high in the Netherlands.
We end this section by giving some information on the relevance of internal versus
external funds for the ﬁnancing of Dutch ﬁrms. Although, exact ﬁgures are not avail-
able, the evidence strongly suggest that Dutch ﬁrms, like ﬁrms in other industrialized
countries, prefer internal funds over external funds. A large scale interview study by
De Haan et al. (1994) shows that 54% of all ﬁrms prefer internal funds, 18% of all
ﬁrms prefer debt and 3% of all ﬁrms prefer share issues. De Haan et al. (1998) ﬁnd
that about 25% of medium-sized and large ﬁrms faced debt constraints in the years
1985-1992.
3. The relevance of capital structure theory for the Netherlands
The analysis of the previous section suggests that Dutch ﬁrms prefer internal funds
over external funds. Moreover, debt ﬁnance is much more important than equity ﬁ-
nance. This does not differ from the situation in many other industrialized countries.
However, the previous section has also pointed at some important special features of
the Dutch system, such as the importance of pension funds and life insurance com-
panies and the concentration rate of commercial banks. One may wonder whether
the special features of the Dutch system are important for capital structure choice of
Dutch ﬁrms. This section tries to assess the relevance of capital structure theory for
the capital structure choice of Dutch companies. Moreover, it tries to value the impor-
tance of the Dutch specialties for the ﬁnancing decision of ﬁrms in the Netherlands.
Broadly speaking ﬁve theoretical approaches can be distinguished, namely, models
based on tax considerations, agency costs, asymmetric information, product/input
market interactions, and corporate control issues. For a survey, see Harris and Raviv
(1991).
3.1 Models based on tax considerations
Many discussions on capital structure choice deal with the effects of taxes, or more
precisely with the effects of different taxation of debt and equity. Modigliani and
Miller (1958) show that due to the fact that interest payments on debt are tax de-
ductible, corporate taxation implies that the invariance condition no longer holds.
Under plausible values for tax variables, an increase in leverage would increase the
value of the ﬁrm.
Due to its large institutional detail it goes beyond the scope of this paper to give an
overall and complete theoretical discussion of the effects of taxation on the market
5value of ﬁrms. It may be preferable to consult comparative empirical work in this area
(see, for instance, Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Moreover, for the subject matter of this
paper it is relevant to have a look at the Dutch case. In ﬁrst instance, it seems that
tax considerations are important determinants of the ﬁnancing hierarchy and hence
capital structure of Dutch ﬁrms. In the Netherlands, the corporate tax rate is rather
low, from an international comparative perspective. Interest is tax deductible for cor-
porate taxes, dividend is (progressively) taxed as income and capital gains are tax
exempt. However, investors are allowed to choose a dividend re-investment option,
under which dividend can become tax-free. In general, though, the Dutch tax system
favors debt over equity ﬁnancing and hence can explain why ﬁrms prefer debt over
share issues. The Dutch tax system cannot explain why ﬁrms prefer internal ﬁnance
over debt (De Haan et al., 1994, p. 300). Therefore, tax considerations can at the best
only partly explain capital structure choice of Dutch ﬁrms, so that other theories are
needed to understand the Dutch case.
3.2 Models based on agency costs
The agency costs models were initiated by Jensen and Meckling (1976), building
on earlier work of Fama and Miller (1972). Under this framework, (1) debt is con-
sidered as a necessary mechanism to mitigate the conﬂicts between equity holders
and managers. The arguments are: ﬁrst of all, debt ﬁnancing reduces the amount of
“free” cash available at managers’ disposal (Jensen, 1986) , and it explains why com-
panies in mature industries with few growth opportunities and abundant cash ﬂow
tend to have high leverage ratio. Secondly, debt can be considered as a mechanism to
force liquidation if a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow is poor (Harris and Raviv, 1990), even though
managers may always want to continue ﬁrms’ current operation whereas sharehold-
ers may be better-off by liquidating current operations. Further, managers’ tendency
in empire building can be conﬁned with debt ﬁnancing (Stulz 1990) 2. The optimal
capital structure isthus obtained bytrading offthe beneﬁt ofdebt inpreventing invest-
ment in value decreasing projects against the cost of debt in preventing investment in
value increasing projects.
(2) Once debt is introduced into capital ﬁnancing, another type of conﬂict of inter-
est among agents emerges: the conﬂict between equity holders and debt holders. In
a highly leveraged ﬁrm, the incentives for shareholders to push managers to pursue
riskier projects can result in an asset substitution problem 3. Diamond (1989) argues
2 Managers’ tendency in empire building may sometimes lead them to carry out negative net present
value projects even though paying out cash is a better choice for shareholders.
3 Because of shareholders’ limited liability, they suffer minimal declines in wealth if the project fails,
6that agency costs from the above mentioned perspective are trivial for older, more es-
tablished ﬁrms with good track records of repaying debt. These ﬁrms value their rep-
utation along with the lower borrowing costs, thus prefering safe projects rather than
risky projects. Young ﬁrms with little reputation may choose risky projects. Man-
agers’ reputation concerns in the managerial labor market can somehow reduce the
agency costs of debt, as managers’ objective is to maximize the probability of suc-
cess, while shareholders prefer to maximize expected returns (Hirshleifer and Thakor,
1989 ). Leverage may cause another adverse incentive which is the so called under-
investment problem, in which case managers, acting in shareholders’ interest, might
reject investments which would increase ﬁrm value because the expected gains would
accrue largely to creditors (Myers, 1977).
The agency theory emphasizes agency conﬂicts with equity holders. Therefore, in
order to assess the relevance of the agency theory for explaining the capital structure
choice of Dutch ﬁrms, it is important to consider the role of equity holders in the
Netherlands. The possibilities of (internal) shareholders to control and monitor the
corporate sector depend on the ownership structure of shares and on the inﬂuence of
shareholders on the supervisory board of ﬁrms. In the Netherlands, shareholdings of
companies are more widely dispersed, especially in comparison to the concentration
of shareholdings in Germany. This implies that there are many small shareholders,
who have little incentives in monitoring the ﬁrms. Moreover, corporate governance
can be characterized as a system of cooptation. In this system, new members of the
supervisory board are elected by the current members of the supervisory board. Nev-
ertheless, in practice it appears that the management board strongly inﬂuences the
composition of the supervisory board. The system of cooptation reduces the corpo-
rate governance role of shareholders in general. The system of cooptation is also one
of the reasons why pension funds do not have an important role in corporate gover-
nance in the Netherlands, although a substantial percentage of total corporate shares
is held by them (about 8%). Pension funds are mainly interested in the safeness of
their investments, and generally do not try to change policies of ﬁrms. The limited
role of pension funds in inﬂuencing corporate strategies is magniﬁed by the weak
links of pension funds with the supervisory board representation, as is the case in the
system of cooptation. This probably implies that one of the main differences between
the Dutch system and other industrialized countries, being the importance of pension
funds and life insurance companies (see previous section) does not play an important
role in the capital structure choice of Dutch ﬁrms.
Another special feature of the Dutch system concerns the high concentration rate of
while they reap all of the gains in wealth if the project is successful. On the other hand, creditors can
never receive more than their promised return.
7the Dutch banking sector. Moreover, in the Dutch system, banks are not precluded
from owning non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. However, percentage wise, banks’ ownership of
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms is not signiﬁcant in real practice (Chirinko et. al, 1998) . It seems
that the large Dutch banks have the exceptional ability on focusing on doing what
they are best at, i.e. managing to grow through international banking acquisitions (a
broader term here) rather than putting themselves into total new territory to manage
non-ﬁnancial business. Shareholdings of commercial banks in the Netherlands are
extremely small (below 1% of total shareholdings) and proxy voting whereby banks
are allowed to vote for shareholders who deposit their shares with banks hardly ex-
ists. Hence, the corporate governance role of banks in the Netherlands is limited. In
the Netherlands, banks do not seem to monitor the corporate sector for reasons of
controlling ﬁrms policies, they predominantly monitor from a creditor’s perspective.
The small corporate governance role of shareholders in the Netherlands suggests that
agency problems between shareholders on the one hand and managers and debt hold-
ers on the other hardly exist. It also implies that monitoring by creditors (banks) is
relatively important, which reduces risk-taking activities of Dutch ﬁrms. Most im-
portantly, the (almost) absence of a corporate governance role of shareholders makes
the traditional version of the agency theory irrelevant for explaining capital structure
choice of Dutch ﬁrms.
The small inﬂuence of shareholders and the important role for managers may also
imply that maximizing shareholders value is not the main objective of Dutch ﬁrms.
This is partly conﬁrmed by an early survey conducted by Stonehill, et al. (1975). In
this survey, French, Japanese, Dutch and Norwegian ﬁnancial executives shared the
same view that a sustained growth in after-tax earnings, not necessarily maximiz-
ing shareholders’ wealth, is their main goal. In the United States, on the other hand,
growth in earnings per share was the unequivocal ﬁrst choice for ﬁnancial executives,
which can be viewed as the indirect way of maximizing shareholders’ value. Hence,
the survey shows that the normative goal of maximizing share-holders’ value, in cap-
ital management case, minimizing the cost of capital, has to be modiﬁed, particularly
in analyzing the capital structure decisions in countries such as the Netherlands.
3.3 Models based on asymmetric information
Generally, asymmetric information theory assumes that ﬁrm managers or insiders
possess private information about the characteristics of the ﬁrm’s return streams or
investment opportunities. (1) Management can use the ﬁrm’s capital structure to sig-
nal the information. According to Ross’s model (1977), investors take larger debt
levels as a signal of management’s conﬁdence in the ﬁrm. Thus the issuance of debt
8is good news to the ﬁnancial market4. The main empirical implication of this model
is that ﬁrm value (or proﬁtability), debt level, and bankruptcy probability are all posi-
tively related. However, any ﬁrm attempting to convince the market that it is of a type
other than its true type will gain from overvaluation of one security and lose from
undervaluation of the other (Heinkel, 1982) 5. In cases that involve competition be-
tween an incumbent ﬁrm and an entrant, low cost entrants signal this fact by issuing
debt while the incumbent and high cost entrants issue only equity. The main result is
that issuance of debt is good news to the ﬁnancial market (Poitevin, 1989) .
(2) Management’s decision on its ﬁrm’s capital ﬁnancing can be viewed as a way
to mitigate inefﬁciencies in the ﬁrm’s investment decisions that are caused by the
information asymmetry. With information asymmetry, a ﬁrm will choose to ﬁnance
new investment, ﬁrst internally, then with low risk debt, and ﬁnally with equity as a
last resort. Thisis often referred as the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984,
and Myers, 1984 ). The most important implication according to this line of analysis
is that, upon announcement of an equity issue, the market value of the ﬁrm’s existing
shares will fall. Firms with comparatively little tangible assets relative to ﬁrm value
are more subject to information asymmetries. For such ﬁrms, the under-investment
problem will occur more often than for similar ﬁrms with less severe information
asymmetries 6.
The relevance of models based on asymmetric information may ﬁrst be examined by
considering transaction costs for ﬁnancial intermediates, such as commercial banks.
De Bondt (1998) suggests that the importance of the private credit market in the
Netherlands is a result of the low transaction costs for banks, and the low informa-
tion asymmetries of banks regarding the corporate sector. Especially in the UK and
the Netherlands, the corporate sector does not seem to have considerable problems
with respect to communicating information to the banking sector. Therefore, costs of
borrowing from banks may be kept low for the corporate sector, which may explain
the importance of the indirect credit market vis-` a-vis the direct credit market.
More insights into the importance of models based on asymmetric information is
given bythesurvey study ofDeHaanetal. (1994). Theyinterview nonﬁnancial Dutch
companies by sending them questionnaires. Their sample consists of both listed and
4 In the Ross model, managers know the true distribution of ﬁrm returns, but investors do not. Man-
agers beneﬁt if the ﬁrm’s securities are more highly valued by the market but are penalized if the ﬁrm
goes bankrupt. Leland and Pyle (1977) adapt the similar approach on this topic.
5 In equilibrium, the amounts issued of debt and equity are such that the gains and losses balance at
the margin.
6 Krasker (1986) conﬁrms the results of Myers and Majluf and shows that the larger the stock issue
the worse the signal and the fall in the ﬁrm’s stock price.
9non-listed companies. The interviews show that about 75% of all responding ﬁrms
have a certain ﬁnancial hierarchy, whereas 25% of the ﬁrms do not give a preference
ordering. Within this last group there may be some ﬁrms which have no access to
capital markets, so that they are forced to ﬁnance with internal funds, and hence can
not choose between different sources of funds. As mentioned before, De Haan et al.
show that 54% of all ﬁrms prefer internal funds, 18% of all ﬁrms prefer debt and 3%
of all ﬁrms prefer share issues. This strongly conﬁrms the relevance of the pecking-
order theory, and hence asymmetric information, for explaining capital structure of
Dutch ﬁrms. De Haan et al. also provide information on the reasons why ﬁrms prefer
a certain type of funds. A substantial part (35%) of the ﬁrms refers to credit rationing
as the main reason for their preference for internal ﬁnancing. The costs of external
ﬁnance also plays an important role. These two reasons suggest that asymmetric in-
formation, leading to credit rationing and higher costs of external ﬁnance, can explain
why ﬁrms prefer internal ﬁnance in the Netherlands. This is somewhat in contrast to
the remarks made by De Bondt who suggests that asymmetric information is not of
great importance in the Netherlands (see above).
One of the most striking results of the survey of De Haan et al. (1994) concerns
the target capital structure of ﬁrms. Most of the ﬁrms respond that they do not have
a target capital structure, which suggests that their capital structure mainly depends
on the availability of internal funds. This further supports the pecking order theory.
Firms with a target capital structure appear to be the larger ﬁrms and the publicly
listed ﬁrms. this is conﬁrmed in the study by Cools (1993). He only interviews listed
companies and ﬁnds that 54% of the companies have a target leverage ratio. In the
group of ﬁrms with a target capital structure in the study of De Haan et al. (1994),
proﬁtability appears to be a major determinant. Since leverage is said to be negatively
related to proﬁtability, this again points at the relevance of the pecking order theory.
The same result is obtained by Cools (1993).
3.4 Models based on product/input market interactions and ﬁrms’ business
nature
Under this framework, a ﬁrm’s speciﬁc industry environment, such as its relation-
ships to its customers, suppliers and of rival ﬁrms, and a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing decisions
interacts. (1) Brander and Lewis (1986) address the relationship between a ﬁrm’s
capital structure and its strategy when competing in the product market. They ar-
gue that oligopolists increase risk by a more aggressive output policy. They show
that oligopolists tend to have more debt than monopolists or ﬁrms in competitive in-
10dustries, and that the debt will tend to be long term 7. If managers are assumed to
maximize the value of equity (as opposed to the value of the ﬁrm), there will be a
maximum level of leverage that ﬁrms can achieve without destroying the possibility
of tacit collusion (Maksimovic, 1988) 8.
(2) The second industrial-organization-based approach addresses the relationship be-
tween a ﬁrm’s capital structure and the characteristics of its growth opportunity, prod-
uct or input. Under this framework, capital structure is inﬂuenced by ﬁrms’customers
and/or suppliers, i.e. a ﬁrm’s product (input) or product market (input market) char-
acteristics interacts in a signiﬁcant way with the debt level 9. Titman (1984) argues
that liquidation of a ﬁrm may impose costs on its customers (or suppliers) such as
inability to obtain the product, parts, and/or service. These costs are transferred to
the stockholders in the form of lower prices for the ﬁrm’s product. Titman shows
that capital structure can be used to commit the shareholders to an optimal liquida-
tion policy 10. Maksimovic and Titman (1991) show that producers of non-unique
and non-durable goods may also be subject to a similar effect. The reputation for
being a high quality producer is lost when the ﬁrm goes bankrupt. One would expect
ﬁrms that produce high quality products tend to have less debt. If tacit collusion is
important, debt is limited, and debt capacity increases with the elasticity of demand.
Another advantage of debt is that debt strengthens the bargaining position of equity
holders in dealing with input suppliers which predicts that highly unionized ﬁrms
and/or ﬁrms that employ workers with highly transferable skills will have more debt,
ceteris paribus (Sarig, 1988) .
Due to a shortage of information, it is almost impossible to gauge the relevance of
the models based on product/input market interactions for capital structure choice
in the Netherlands. However, some information can be obtained from the studies of
Cools (1993) and De Haan et al. (1994). These studies suggest that capital structure
choice differs for different groups of ﬁrms, which may be seen as an indication for the
7 They use the basic idea of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that increases in leverage induce equity
holders to pursue riskier strategies.
8 He derives comparative static results on debt capacity as a function of industry and ﬁrm charac-
teristics and shows that debt capacity increases with the elasticity of demand and decreases with the
discount rate.
9 The examples include customers’ need for a particular product or service, the need for workers
to invest in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, product quality, and the bargaining power of workers or other
suppliers.
10 Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm will default only when the net gain to liquidation exceeds the cost to customers.
It is shown that ﬁrms for which this effect is more important, e.g., computer and automobile companies,
will have less debt, other things equal, than ﬁrms for which this effect is less important, e.g., hotels and
restaurants.
11importance of this set of theories, although this may also be caused by asymmetric
information issues.
3.5 Theories driven by corporate control considerations
Following the growing takeover activities in the 1980’s, the ﬁnance literature began
to examine the linkage between the market for corporate control and capital structure.
How capital structure affects the outcome of takeover contests through its effect on
the distribution of votes, the value of the ﬁrm, and the price effects of takeover are
discussed in detail by Harris and Raviv (1988). Israel (1992) studies how capital
structure affects the distribution of cash ﬂows between equity and debt claimants.
They show that the optimal share of incumbent can be obtained by choosing a certain
debt level. However, the expected beneﬁts on control decrease with the debt level,
thus it is optimal to choose the lowest debt level. If the case where successful tender
offer is optimal, the ﬁrmwill have no debt 11. Generally speaking, proxy ﬁghtsrequire
some debt, and unsuccessful tender offer requires even more debt. Takeover targets
will increase their debt levels on average and targets of unsuccessful tender offers
will issue more debt on average than targets of successful tender offers or proxy
ﬁghts. Debt issues are usually accompanied by stock price increases. The ability of
shareholders to affect the nature of a takeover attempt is by changing the incumbent’s
ownership share 12; increases in debt also increase the gain to target shareholders if a
takeover occurs but lower the probability of this event (Israel, 1992) . The argument
is that target and acquiring shareholders bargain only over the portion of the gains
that is not previously committed to debt holders. The more debt, the less gain is
left for target and acquiring shareholders to split and the smaller is the portion of
the gain captured by acquiring shareholders. The optimal debt level is obtained by
maximizing target shareholders’ payoff, subject to the decrease in the probability
that takeover occurs. The optimal debt level is determined by balancing this effect
against the reduced probability of takeover resulting from the reduced share of the
gain that accrues to acquiring stockholders.
In the Netherlands, the limited role of internal shareholders regarding corporate con-
trol (see above) also seems to hold for external shareholders. Models based on corpo-
11 They assume that incumbent’s objective is to maximize his expected payoff which is the value of
his equity stake plus the value of his control beneﬁts if he remains in control.
12 This conclusion is drawn by Stulz (1988) . He discusses how the ownership share of the incumbent
is affected by capital structure and obtains the result that takeover targets have an optimal debt level
that maximizes the value of outside investors’ shares. Targets of hostile takeovers will have more debt
than those ﬁrms that are not targets. Moreover, the probability of a takeover is negatively related to the
target’s debt/equity ratio, and the takeover premium is positively related to this ratio.
12rate control considerations argue that there isanefﬁcient market for corporate control,
in the sense that threats of takeovers may act as a disciplining device. The threats of
takeovers may discipline managers and stimulate them to act in shareholders inter-
est. However, in the Netherlands, as in Germany but in contrast to the US, there are
all kind of mechanisms by which hostile takeovers are prevented. For instance, the
system of cooptation in combination with the fact that members of the supervisory
appoint the members of the management board, protect managers from shareholders.
Other “defence” possibilities which are often used are e.g.: issuing preference shares,
which give the holders a right to a ﬁxed dividend percentage before other sharehold-
ers receive dividend, and priority shares, which may give the holder special rights,
such as appointing members of the management. Both types of shares reduce the
beneﬁts of ordinary shares and hence discourage takeovers. The (almost) absence of
hostile takeovers strongly reduces the efﬁciency of the market for corporate control
via monitoring of external shareholder control. This also implies that the traditional
models based on corporate control considerations do not have an important role in
explaining capital structure choice of Dutch ﬁrms.
3.6 Conclusions
What can be concluded from the survey in this section? First, since the corporate
governance role of share holders seems to be unimportant, models based on agency
costs are probably of minor importance for explaining capital structure choice of the
corporate sector in the Netherlands. Second, since proxy votes are unimportant and
since hostile takeovers are extremely rare, the evidence suggests that theories driven
by corporate control considerations are also relatively unimportant for explaining
capital structure choice in the Netherlands. Third, tax considerations cannot explain
the preference for internal funds, so that also the relevance of tax considerations may
be questioned. Fourth, there seems to be some evidence for the importance of mod-
els based on product/input market interactions and ﬁrms business nature since some
studies suggest that capital structure choice differs for different groups of ﬁrms. How-
ever, this can also be explained by models based on asymmetric information. These
group of models seem to be very important for explaining capital structure choice
in the Netherlands. Some recent interview studies strongly conﬁrm the pecking or-
der theory and hence suggest that models based on asymmetric information are most
important for explaining capital structure choice of Dutch ﬁrms.
In the remainder of this paper we will further test the relevance of different theories
for explaining capital structure choice of the Dutch corporate sector by an empirical
panel data analysis. The analyses will mainly provide more information on the rel-
evance of agency theories versus asymmetric information theories for Dutch capital
13structure choice. Due to a lack of data, it is difﬁcult to test for the importance of the
other theories.
4. Determinants and measures of capital structure
Titman & Wessles (1988), among many other authors 13, have conducted empirical
tests on capital structure determinants in the United States. An early piece of cross
country study was conducted by Toy, et al. (1974) in 1974 to investigate the determi-
nants of capital structure in manufacturing sectors of France, Japan, the Netherlands,
Norway, and the United States. Rajan and Zingales (1995) investigate the determi-
nants of capital structure of G7 countries after some detailed accounting adjustments.
The basis approach that has been taken in empirical work is trying to identify certain
proxies for the unobservable theoretical attributes. As Titman & Wessels (1988) have
explained, this approach certainly has its limitations. First of all, there may be some
attributes which can not be wellrepresented by available proxies, or there may be sev-
eral proxies that can be used for certain attributes. Secondly, the attributes themselves
can be related as well, so the proxies chosen may actually measure the effects of sev-
eral different attributes. Thirdly, measurement errors in the proxy variables may be
correlated with measurement errors in the dependent variables thus creates spurious
correlations.
Our empirical research intends to further investigate the relevance of different capital
structure theories for capital structure choice in the Netherlands. We focus on the
following six attributes: asset tangibility, growth, size, earning volatility, proﬁtability
and market to book ratio. The data used in this study are constructed from the annual
ﬁnancial report of listed Dutch ﬁrms. The construction of the data set is explained in
more detail in Section 5.
4.1 Asset Tangibility
In an uncertain world, with asymmetric information, the asset structure of a ﬁrm has
a direct impact on its capital structure since ﬁrms tangible assets are the most widely
accepted sources for bank borrowing and raising secured debt. If banks have imper-
fect information regarding the behavior of the ﬁrm, ﬁrms with little tangible assets
13 See also Ferri and Jones (1979) , Bowen, et al. (1982), Boquist and Moore (1982), Bradley, Jarrell
and Kim (1984), Long and Malitz (1985), Kim and S¨ orensen (1986) , Friend and Hasbrouch/Lang
(1988, 1988) , Givoly, et al. (1992).
14ﬁnd it difﬁcult to raise funds via debt ﬁnancing. This suggests that a positive relation-
ship between asset tangibility and leverage implies the existence of imperfect infor-
mation, and hence indirectly conﬁrms the relevance of models based on asymmetric
information for explaining capital structure choice of Dutch ﬁrms. On the other hand,
the absence of a relationship between tangible assets and leverage seems to suggest
that information problems do not play an important role. Hence, the sign of the co-
efﬁcient with respect to asset tangibility provides information on the importance of
theories based on asymmetric information.
We use the ratio of tangible asset to total asset (TANG) for the tangibility attribute.
We use the sum of ﬁxed assets and inventories as tangible assets.
4.2 Growth
Different theories give different predictions on how a ﬁrm’s growth is related to its
leverage. The agency theory predicts a negative relationship between growth and
leverage. Myers’ (1977) underinvestment problem suggests a negative relationship
between growth and long-term debt. The argument is that a ﬁrm’s growth oppor-
tunities are intangible assets instead of tangible assets; the liquidity effect of high
leverage may reduce a ﬁrm’s ability to ﬁnance its future growth. So he suggests that
managers at ﬁrms with valuable growth opportunities should choose low leverage.
However, according to Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996), leverage is negatively related to
growth only for ﬁrms with low Tobin’s q ratio, i.e. for ﬁrms whose growth opportu-
nities are not recognized by the capital market. But the negative relationship between
leverage and growth does not hold for ﬁrms or industries with high Tobin’s q ratio.
Weuse percentage change ofsales year overyear astheproxy forgrowth(GROWTH).
Even though the signs of the coefﬁcient with respect to growth remain positive, they
are not signiﬁcant.
4.3 Size
A ﬁrm’s size is considered positively related to leverage. The most important argu-
mentis that informational asymmetries are less severe forlarger ﬁrmsthan forsmaller
ﬁrms. If the public is more aware of what is going on at larger ﬁrms, the ﬁrm will
ﬁnd it easier to raise debt. Further, larger ﬁrms can diversify their investment projects
on a broader basis and limit their risk to cyclical ﬂuctuation in one particular line of
production. Thus the ﬁnancial distress risk can be considered lower for larger ﬁrms.
We use the logarithm of sales as the proxy for size (SIZE)and interpret a positive sign
as evidence for the relevance of capital market imperfections and hence the impor-
15tance of models based on asymmetric information for Dutch capital structure choice.
4.4 Earning Volatility
Apart from some inherent cyclicality or seasonality related to certain lines of busi-
nesses, ﬁnancial markets usually regard a ﬁrm’s volatile earnings as the results of
poor management therefore discounting such ﬁrm’s stock price and demanding an
extra premium should such ﬁrm seek debt ﬁnancing. Generally speaking, these ﬁrms
will face additional difﬁculties in external ﬁnancing. According to this line of argu-
ment, earning volatility should be negatively related to leverage. However, the agency
theory suggests a positive relationship between earning volatility and leverage. The
reason is that the underinvestment problem decreases when the volatility of ﬁrm’s
returns increases (see Cools, 1993, p. 223).
We use the absolute value of the ﬁrst difference of percentage change of operating
income as the proxy for earning volatility (EVOL). The results are mixed.
4.5 Proﬁtability
Many authors have different views on the relationship between leverage and prof-
itability. The pecking order theory strongly suggests a negative relationship between
leverage and proﬁtability. If a ﬁrm has more retained earnings, it will be in a better
position to ﬁnance its future projects by retained earnings, instead of external debt
ﬁnancing. However, in Ross’s (1977) and Leland and Pyle’s (1977) approaches, the
choice of the ﬁrm’s capital structure signals to outside investors the information of
insiders, in which case investors take larger debt levels as a signal of good perfor-
mance of the ﬁrm and management’s conﬁdence. If their argument is true, one would
expect that ﬁrm value (or proﬁtability) and debt level are positively related.
We use the ratio of operating income to total asset as the proxy for proﬁtability
(PROF). Our result strongly conﬁrms the “pecking order” hypothesis.
4.6 Market to book ratio
The market to book ratio is commonly used as a proxy for Tobin’s q ratio. As we
discussed previously, growth companies will have relatively higher Tobin’s q ratio.
Myers and Majluf’s “pecking order” model and Ross’s ”signaling” model give differ-
ent answers to whether leverage is positively related to growth. The reason for us to
include market to book ratio (MBR) along with growth (GROWTH) as explanatory
variables in our model is that we want to capture more information on the relationship
between growth and leverage.
16Market to book ratio (MBR) is obtained by (total assets - equity book value + year
end stock price  number of shares outstanding)/ total assets. The results are mixed.
4.7 Measures of capital structure
In this paper, we use two measures of ﬁnancial leverage, one is total debt divided
by equity book value (LEVB) and the other is total debt divided by equity market
value (LEVM). Data limitation conﬁnes us to measure debt only in book value. Again
equity market value is the product of year-end stock price and the number of shares
outstanding. The reasons for us to choose both book value and market value leverage
are: (1) various capital structure theories have not speciﬁed explicitly which leverage
measurements should be used; (2) for consistency purpose, most empirical studies
have used both book value leverage and market value leverage.
5. The Data Set and Summary Statistics
We use the dataset Jaarboek van Nederlandse ondernemingen 1984-1995. Starting
from 1984, there are about 140 ﬁrms in our dataset, and over 200 by 1995. After
deleting all ﬁnancial companies (leverage pertaining to ﬁnancial companies are not
our concern in this particular study), newly privatized and still partially government
owned enterprises (their unique capital structures demand further study from different
perspectives), and all the observations that did not have a complete record, we retain
51 ﬁrms over 12 year period of time in a balanced panel.
The panel structure of LEVB/LEVM for 51 ﬁrms over 12 years between 1984-95
are plotted in Figure 7.1. Our data show that book value leverage for each ﬁrm is
rather consistent compared with market value leverage. However, we cannot simply
state that the leverage ratio is set at random, either. Because our data also show that
book value leverage does not change dramatically across ﬁrms, which suggests that
the leverage ratio at ﬁrm level actually falls into a narrow band. Summary statistics of
the data set, including mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum are
reported in Table 7.2. The variation of LEVB/LEVM with each explanatory variables
are plotted in Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3. The correlation matrix is reported in Table
7.3.
6. The Panel Data Model
The panel data model we specify in this paper is of the following structure:












1i f i D j
0 otherwise
which areused tocapture the individual effects (either ﬁxedorrandom). Inour model,
yit D LEVB or LEVM, and xit D[TANG, GROWTH, SIZE, EVOL, PROF, MBR]0,
where i D 1;2;:::;51;t D1;2;:::;12.
6.1 The level panel data model: OLS estimation and speciﬁcation test
In the above model setup, assumptions for consistency and efﬁciency of OLS estima-
tor are as follows:





j/ D 0; if i 6D j.
Assumption (i) states that the unconditional mean of the error term is zero; (ii) a) con-
stant  2
 for all i means no cross-sectional heteroscedasticity; and b) identity matrix
ITT means no autocorrelation over time within each section; (iii) implies no cross-
sectional correlation. OLS; OLS are BLUE (best linear unbiased estimator) under
the assumptions of (i), (ii) and (iii).
Fixed effects versus random effects: To test the ﬁxed effects versus random effects,
we employ the Hausman speciﬁcation test. The test statistics for the model with
LEVB and LEVM as dependent variables are respectively 22.911 and 39.948. Both
statistics are asymptotically 2 distributed with 6 degrees of freedom. The random
effect models can be rejected at any conventional critical level.
Estimation Results: The estimation results of the ﬁxed effects model for both LEVB
and LEVM are reported Tables 4 and 5 respectively. The relationship between capital
structure and various factors are summarized in Table 8 for each model.
Based on t−statistics, the estimates of all explanatory variables except TANG and
18MBR are signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 95% signiﬁcance level either by
using book value leverage or market value leverage. We further employ the F−test
for the null hypothesis H0 : ; D i;and H0 : ; D i; i, for model LEVB
the test statistics are F.50;555/ D 17:167 and F.300;255/ D 2:9416. For model
LEVM the test statistics are F.50;555/ D 8:0442 and F.300;255/ D 3:9012. In
both cases, the null hypotheses are rejected, thus there is a distinct ﬁxed effect among
ﬁrms for the level panel data model.
For both models LEVB and LEVM, we perform a formal White test for homoscedas-
ticity in the ﬁxed effects framework based on OLS estimation results. The White
test statistics for both models are respectively 88.05 and 110.96. The test statistics
(NTR2) in both cases are asymptotically 2 distributed with degree of freedom 27.
The null hypotheses of homoscedasticity are strongly rejected. This implies that the
results with the OLS estimator should be taken with caution and that another estima-
tion technique is needed.
6.2 The year-to-year change panel data model: Various components
estimation and speciﬁcation
In this section, we conduct further analysis by estimating a panel data model of the
year-to-year change in leverage with respect to changes in various factors. Such a
model can allow us to test the joint hypotheses: ﬁrms are actively choosing certain
level of leverage due to the changes of certain factors as predicted by theories; and
ﬁrms are free to do so given the macroeconomic and ﬁnancial environment. From
an econometric point of view, this model can alleviate the problem associated with
heteroscedasticity as well as auto- and cross-correlation among error terms.
Fixed effects versus random effects: To test the ﬁxed effects versus random effects,
we employ the Hausman speciﬁcation test. The test statistics for the model with
1LEVBt and 1LEVMt as explained variables are respectively 1.5121 and 0.46158.
Both statistics are asymptotically 2 distributed with 6 degrees of freedom. The ran-
dom effect models can not be rejected at any conventional critical level, which is
a plausible result for the year-to-year change panel data model. Intuitively, we do
not expect the relationship between year-to-year change of ﬁrms’ leverage and the
year-to-year changes of the independent variables have ﬁrm speciﬁc effects.
Estimation Results: The estimation results of the year-to-year change panel data mod-
els for both LEVB and LEVM are reported in Tables 6 and 7 respectively. The rela-
tionship between capital structure and various factors are summarized in Table 8 for
each model.
Based on t−statistics, the estimates of all explanatory variables except GROWTHare
19signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 95% signiﬁcance level. We think the reason is
that the measurement for growth in our model has already incorporated the changes
year over year. By taking a second difference, we cannot expect it will have any
deﬁnite sign with respect to the changes in year-to-year leverage changes.
For both models LEVB and LEVM, we perform a formal White test for homoscedas-
ticity in the random effect framework based on variance components estimation re-
sults. The White test statistics for both models are respectively 8.42 and 43.76. The
test statistics (NTR2) in both cases are asymptotically 2 distributed with degree of
freedom 27. The null hypotheses of homoscedasticity is not rejected for the LEVB
model at any conventional critical level. But it is rejected for the LEVM model at
5% critical level. Our interpretation is that the leverage measurement based on the
book value–LEVB, tends to be more stable over time while the leverage measure-
ment based market value–LEVM, tends to be more volatile both cross time and cross
ﬁrm as shown in Figure 1.
7. Conclusion and Discussion
This paper examines the relevance of different capital structure theories in explaining
capital structure choice of Dutch ﬁrms. Based on a descriptive analysis and a panel
data study we conclude that theories based on the asymmetric information paradigm,
especially the pecking order theory, is most relevant for explaining ﬁnancing choice
of Dutch companies. Dutch ﬁrms seem to have an preference of internal ﬁnancing
to external ﬁnancing, debt ﬁnancing to equity ﬁnancing. As for the agency cost hy-
potheses, our results are mixed.
Our empirical study also shows that measurement choices of leverage can yield com-
pletely different empirical results, namely the relationship between leverage and ex-
planatory variables do not always yield the same sign with respect to book value
leverage and market value leverage. It is especially necessary to point out that mar-
ket to book ratio is positively related to book value leverage but negatively related
to market value leverage. The positive relationship between market to book ratio and
book value leverage supports Ross’s signaling approach, whereas the negative rela-
tionship between market to book ratio and market value leverage supports Myers and
Majluf’s pecking order hypothesis. We argue that the Ross’s signaling approach and
Myers and Majluf’s pecking order hypothesis are not necessarily contradictory. At
ﬁrm level, management can choose a ﬁrm’s desirable book value leverage, but it will
be very difﬁcult for a ﬁrm to manipulate market value leverage on a very frequent
basis. Relatively speaking, ﬁrms ith high book value leverage convey their positive
20outlook of the ﬁrms’ prospects to the investors, market rewards such ﬁrms by giving
them higher market value relative to their book value. This is the theme of the Ross’s
signalling approach. For the rewarded ﬁrms, carrying a higher market to book value
ratio is equivalent to carrying a lower market value leverage holding debt constant.
Therefore, market value leverage directly reﬂects market assessment with respect to
the portion of equity holders’ claim on a continuous basis. Shareholders of a ﬁrm
with good future prospects will proportionally capture more gains compared with
that of bond holders, which we view simply as another way of stating the pecking
order hypothesis.
Based on our year-to-year change panel data model, our results show that ﬁrms do
actively choose certain level of leverage given the changes with respect to the ex-
planatory variable. Although corporate governance is an actively debated topic in
the Netherlands, our empirical results do not show that management of Dutch public
traded companies are entrenched in their capital structure choice. From a theoreti-
cal point of view, due to the small internal and external corporate governance role
of shareholders, corporate control considerations suggested by various theories seem
to be less relevant for the Dutch case. We argue that relative small and less mo-
bile managerial market in the Netherlands along with the unavoidable management
performance comparison with their international counterparts serves as an indirect
incentive and control mechanism to assure that management at ﬁrm level has to ulti-
mately align their interest with shareholders.
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24Table 7.1: Cross country capital structure choice comparison
Country Leverage Leverage % Indirect % Banks Concentration % long
Year 1982 1992 1993 1992 1995 1993
Germany 1.71 1.53 94 89 19.8 78
France 2.61 1.35 85 85 24.5 73
Italy 4.87 3.24 95 89 24.0 44
UK 1.13 1.04 81 92 30.9 50
Belgium 2.50 1.54 93 90 52.3 63
Holland 1.33 1.27 97 73 73.8 77
Note:
Leverage the debt-equity ratio at book value,
Indirect refers to the share of the indirect credit market in % of total credit to private
sector,
% banks refers to the share of loans from banks in % of total loans to the private
sector,
Concentration refers to the share of the top three banks in % of total assets of banks,
%L o n g refers to the share of long-term credit in % of credit of the corporate sector.
Table 7.2: Summary statistics
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS:612
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum
LEVB 1.45794 1.34269 0.95338 0.056397 9.56406
LEVM 1.43521 0.97323 1.38121 0.048105 10.94690
TANG 0.63627 0.65832 0.16062 0.073458 0.97532
GROWTH 0.06848 0.04347 0.15712 -0.35453 1.70110
SIZE 13.3468 13.2788 1.86849 8.50451 17.98159
EVOL 0.73847 0.20251 2.19981 0.00000 20.41779
PROF 0.08276 0.08056 0.04965 -0.17021 0.27309
MBR 1.15811 1.08708 0.34291 0.61212 3.37682
25Table 7.3: Correlation Matrix
LEVB LEVM TANG GROW SIZE EVOL PROF MBR
LEVB 1.000
LEVM 0.591 1.000
TANG -0.026 0.005 1.000
GROW 0.058 -0.126 -0.099 1.000
SIZE 0.232 0.168 0.081 0.018 1.000
EVOL 0.151 0.146 0.089 0.001 -0.069 1.000
PROF -0.381 -0.531 -0.086 0.305 -0.065 -0.213 1.000
MBR -0.028 -0.461 -0.063 0.268 0.050 -0.115 0.520 1.000
Table 7.4: Level panel data model: ﬁxed effects estimates: LEVB
Variable Estimated Coefﬁcient Standard Error t-statistic
TANG 1.65685 0.38426 4.31178
GROWTH 0.59878 0.16025 3.73647
SIZE 0.11996 0.07334 1.63562
EVOL 0.00567 0.01170 -0.48493
PROF -5.10414 0.77472 -6.58828
MBR 0.39035 0.09762 3.99857
Note: Adjusted R2 D :0359
Table 7.5: Level panel data model: ﬁxed effects estimates: LEVM
Variable Estimated Coefﬁcient Standard Error t-statistic
TANG .548396 .625466 .876780
GROWTH .267175 .260849 1.02425
SIZE -.390486 .119384 -3.27085
EVOL -.045720 .019053 -2.39965
PROF -6.03759 1.26104 -4.78779
MBR -.832388 .158904 -5.23829
Note: Adjusted R2 D :0915
26Table 7.6: Year-to-year change panel data model: random effects estimates: LEVB
Variable Estimated Coefﬁcient Standard Error t-statistic
TANG 1.54744 .469200 3.29803
GROWTH .264934 .143508 1.84613
SIZE .893748 .224858 3.97472
EVOL -.816107 1.10041 -.741642
PROF -4.12022 .667533 -6.17231
MBR .130005 .102256 1.27137
Note: Adjusted R2 D :0425
Table 7.7: Year-to-year change panel data model: random effects estimates: LEVM
Variable Estimated Coefﬁcient Standard Error t-statistic
TANG -.150590 .814757 -.184829
GROWTH .001941 .248974 .007795
SIZE -.304489 .388520 .783715
EVOL -4.73945 1.91216 -2.47859
PROF -5.77568 1.16024 -4.97800
MBR -1.19174 .177583 -6.71089
Note: Adjusted R2 D 0:0507
Table 7.8: The relationship between capital structure and various factors
Signs by L evel estimation Y -Y change estimation
Factors theories LEVB LEVM LEVB LEVM
TANG + +(***) + +(***) -
GROWTH +,- +(***) + +(*) -
SIZE + +(*) -(***) +(***) +
EVOL - + -(**) - -(**)
PROF +,- -(***) -(***) -(***) -(***)
MBR +,- +(***) -(***) + -(***)
Note:
* — signiﬁcant at 10% critical level;
** — signiﬁcant at 5% critical level;
*** — signiﬁcant at 1% critical level.
2728Figure 7.1: Plot of LEVB/LEVM for 57 ﬁrms over 12 years
29Figure 7.2: Variation of LEVB with various determinants
3031Figure 7.3: Variation of LEVM with various determinants
3233